An Empirical Analysis of Certificate Revocation Lists

Managing public key certificates revocation has long been a central issue in public key infrastructures. Though various certificate revocation mechanisms have been proposed to address this issue, little effort has been devoted to the empirical analysis of real-world certificate revocation data. In this paper, we conduct such an empirical analysis based on a large amount of data collected from VeriSign. Our study enables us to understand how long a revoked certificate lives and what the difference is in the lifetime of revoked certificates by certificate types, geographic locations, and organizations. Our study also provides a solid foundation for future research on optimal management of certificate revocation for different types of certificates requested from different organizations and located in different geographic locations.
Date: September 02, 2008
Book Title: Proceeedings of the 22nd annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and Applications Security
Type: InProceedings
Chapter: Lecture Notes In Computer Science
Volume: Vol. 5094
Publisher: Springer-Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg
Downloads: 356

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Bibtex


@InProceedings{An_Empirical_Analysis_of_Certificate_Rev,
  author = "Daryl Walleck and Yingjiu Li and Shouhuai Xu",
  title = "{An Empirical Analysis of Certificate Revocation Lists}",
  month = "September",
  year = "2008",
  chapter = "Lecture Notes In Computer Science",
  volume = "Vol. 5094",
  booktitle = "Proceeedings of the 22nd annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and Applications Security",
  publisher = "Springer-Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg",
}