Incentive and Trust Issues in Assured Information Sharing

Assured information sharing among different organizations in a coalitional environment is an important first step in accomplishing many critical tasks. For example, different security agencies may need to share intelligence information for detecting terrorist plots. At the same, each organization participating in the assured information sharing process may have different incentives. In this paper, we explore the effects of different incentives and potential trust issues among organizations on the assured information sharing process by developing an evolutionary game theoretic framework. In addition, we provide extensive simulation analysis that illustrates the impact of various different information sharing strategies.
Date: November 11, 2009
Book Title: International Conference on Collaborative Computing
Type: InProceedings
Address: Washington D.C., USA
Downloads: 727

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@InProceedings{Incentive_and_Trust_Issues_in_Assured_In,
  author = "Ryan Layfield and Murat Kantarcioglu and Xiaohu Li",
  title = "{Incentive and Trust Issues in Assured Information Sharing}",
  month = "November",
  year = "2009",
  address = ", Washington D.C., USA",
  booktitle = "International Conference on Collaborative Computing",
}